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The Fear of Aesthetics in Art and Literary Theory
Sam Rose
Reading the preface to the new edition of the Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, one might think that the battle over the status of aes-thetics is over. According to the narrative of its editor Michael 
Kelly, aesthetics, held in generally low esteem at the time of the 1998 
first edition, has now happily overcome its association with “an alleg-
edly retrograde return to beauty,” or its representation as “an ideology 
defending the tastes of a dominant class, country, race, gender, sexual 
preference, ethnicity, or empire.”1 The previously “rather pervasive anti-
aesthetic stance” of the 1990s passed away with that decade.2 Defined 
as “critical reflection on art, culture, and nature,” aesthetics is now a 
respectable practice once again.3
The publication of the Encyclopedia’s latest iteration is a timely moment 
to review the current state of its much-maligned subject. The original edi-
tion of 1998 faced major difficulties, with Kelly writing that his requests 
for contributions were greeted not only with silence from some, but 
also with responses from angry callers keen to tell him how misguided 
the entire project was.4 And while Kelly emphasizes the change toward 
a more positive view, in some critics, it seems, the fear of aesthetics in 
art and literary theory has only increased. If an early moment in this 
alleged growing dissatisfaction with aesthetics is marked by Jean-Marie 
Schaeffer’s Adieu à l’ésthetique (2000), a more recent one can be found 
in Steven Connor’s essay “Doing Without Art” (2011), where the open-
ing lines of Jacques Rancière’s Aesthetics and Its Discontents—“Aesthetics 
has a bad reputation. Hardly a year goes by without a new book either 
proclaiming that its time is over or that its harmful effects are being 
perpetuated”—are said to “hum with promise.”5 Claiming that no suitable 
account has ever been offered of the existence of that mysterious entity 
“the aesthetic,” Connor suggests that aesthetics needs to be abandoned 
entirely. Gone would be the experience of being “abstractly aware that 
we are responding to something that is art,” “of suspending one’s re-
sponses, or cautiously putting them in brackets,” and gone would be 
the angst that the thought of “doing without art” has often given rise 
to.6 We should instead be sanguine about the possibility that a “whole 
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subject area should simply be,” in the phrase of another more worried 
literary critic, “deleted.”7
The pattern of argument found in Connor’s essay is telling in its focus, 
however. Rather than a direct attack on aesthetics as such, the main thrust 
of the essay is to take issue with the possibility of a definable idea of “the 
aesthetic” that could feasibly underwrite a thing called “art,” along with 
dramatic claims for art’s power that follow from thinkers such as Slavoj 
Žižek, Giorgio Agamben, Rancière, and Alain Badiou. Even within its 
opening pages, the essay subtly shifts from initial talk of “the distinctive-
ness of art and of aesthetic judgement” and of the “definition of art or 
the aesthetic,” into talk of “aesthetic theory” per se. Though critiques of 
aesthetics come in a number of forms, this slippage indicates a common 
move in such arguments. Aesthetics is reduced to one or other arguably 
contingent associations, then dismissed wholesale on that basis. 
In this essay, then, I explore the fear of aesthetics in art and literary 
theory through an examination of common objections. My primary 
focus is the charge of “the narrowness of the aesthetic,” which, as the 
most deep-rooted attack, is the one that I deal with at greatest length 
and with some examination of textual detail. (Given that the problems 
in many cases lie in longstanding textual controversies, the founda-
tional texts of aesthetic theory are read, as far as is possible, through 
subsequent commentators, rather than by taking them outside their 
histories of interpretation.) Two subsidiary charges leveled at aesthet-
ics—equally important, but currently less prominent—are dealt with 
more briefly: the disengagement from politics and the neglect of art. 
In showing how many of these attacks come to contradict and undo 
one another, I move toward a final section where I suggest there may 
be, literally, nothing to be afraid of. Undoing such fear, however, may 
not amount to a straightforward defence of aesthetics, for a redeemed 
aesthetics buys its newfound recovery and rejuvenation at the expense 
of a stable identity or subject matter. Aside from its extension to reflec-
tion on “nature,” there may in the end be nothing left to differentiate 
this apparently triumphant practice of aesthetics from a more general 
domain of art and literary “theory.”
The Narrowness of the Aesthetic: A Genealogy
The primary theme in attacks on aesthetics is the idea that aesthetics 
trades solely in “the aesthetic,” or nothing but highly specialized forms 
of aesthetic experience. Connor’s article is a classic example, from 
within literary theory, of the assumption that there is an inextricable link 
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between aesthetic theory and the theorization of aesthetic experience 
(as “the aesthetic”), and that without the grounding in the latter the 
former simply could not find a justification. The view of the aesthetic 
from which this line of argument takes off finds a more strictly art theo-
retical equivalent in Keith Moxey’s The Practice of Persuasion, where it is 
implied that an art history grounded in aesthetics would be one that 
reduces “the rich variety of human responses to art to a single kind of 
experience.”8 The attacks based on this theme might be summed up 
as saying that those interested in aesthetics assume a definable thing, 
called “the aesthetic” or “beauty,” that this is strictly sensuous and thus 
marked off entirely from cognition, and that the investigation of this is 
the sine qua non of “aesthetics” as a practice. This is more or less what 
James Elkins identifies as the narrowest conception of aesthetics, “shrunk 
to individual passages in Kant and to an identification with beauty.”9
This view takes its support from a particular genealogy of aesthetics. It 
is relatively uncontroversial to say that it was Alexander Gottlieb Baumgar-
ten who, in the mid-eighteenth century, coined the term “aesthetics” to 
designate “the theory of sensuous knowledge,” and that Kant’s Critique 
of the Power of Judgement, at the end of that century, set aesthetics on its 
modern course by systematically uniting a generalizing discussion of 
the arts with philosophizing about knowledge of this kind.10 The more 
tendentious move in the genealogy is the suggestion that, under the 
influence of both Kant and eighteenth-century British aestheticians, 
aesthetics was from this foundational moment set up to deal primarily 
with the special questions of taste and judgement raised by the study of 
the aesthetic in relation to works of art. Conflating “aesthetic” on the 
one hand as designating our response to certain “formal and sensuous 
properties” of things in the world, with “aesthetic” on the other as des-
ignating that which “pertain[s] to art qua art,” aesthetics had laid the 
ground for the notion that the distinguishing properties of art qua art 
simply were its “aesthetic” or “formal and sensuous” ones.11 
This reading of the tradition as it was taken up by twentieth-century 
theorists such as Clive Bell and Clement Greenberg has been aptly 
summed up by Paul Mattick Jr.: “Stemming from late Enlightenment and 
Romantic critical thought, [it] located the essence of art in properties 
of the artistic object—its ability to evoke an ‘aesthetic experience’ in the 
viewer, above all its supposed ‘intrinsic perceptual interest,’ what Bell 
called its possession of ‘significant form.’”12 A number of writers since 
have pointed out that the late twentieth-century reaction against this 
“tradition” was really a reaction against its corruption at the hands of 
those twentieth-century figures, Greenberg above all, with whom it had 
come to be synonymous. The result was either way the same. “Kant” and 
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“aesthetic theory” came to stand for nothing more than a kind of formal-
ism that sought to identify art qua art through the “aesthetic” experience 
generated by the immediately sensible configuration of its objects. By 
the 1980s and the highly influential volume The Anti-Aesthetic, edited by 
Hal Foster, this narrowing down of the purview of aesthetics had pushed 
many toward the view that any mention of aesthetics or “the aesthetic” 
could only mean a reference to this way of thinking.13 According to the 
same view, an embrace of an “anti-aesthetic” stance was the sole way 
to move from Greenberg, formalist modernism, elitist conceptions of 
beauty, and the like, to a contextually minded, conceptually oriented, 
repoliticized view of what visual culture and its study might involve.14
The Narrowness of the Aesthetic: An Internal Response
Such attacks call for both internal and external—i.e., “Kantian” and 
“disciplinary”—replies. 
Internally, it is not hard to show that those in the Kantian tradition 
(call it aesthetics in the “narrow, more or less Kantian sense”) are far 
more nuanced than this picture allows, as attention to its founding figure 
makes clearest.15 The basic error of the purist view of Kantian aesthetics 
is twofold, neatly indicated by Noël Carroll as the consequence of an 
illegitimate subsumption of the philosophy of art under an illegitimately 
narrow conception of aesthetics.16 Where earlier aesthetic theorizing 
tended to take natural beauty as the paradigmatic subject of investiga-
tion, later aesthetic theorists aiming at a characterization of art took 
these investigations and simply “transpos[ed] the theory of beauty onto 
the theory of art” (BA 16).
Standing at the eighteenth-century origin of the tradition, Francis 
Hutcheson is representative in having taken the sensation of beauty 
to be something given immediately in experience, and as such to be 
“disinterested” in the sense of entirely ruling out the possibility that it 
might comprise knowledge (“interest”) of any kind. While Kant moved 
discussion of “beauty” into the realm of the “aesthetic” and “judgements 
of taste,” the definitively influential moment of the third Critique was 
nonetheless a discussion of the “free” beauty found in “pure” judgements 
of taste. The focus of such judgments was the “feeling of purposive-
ness or pattern” afforded by the object, “without regard to [its] actual 
purpose or utility” (in a way that would make contemplation “subservi-
ent to a consideration of practical concerns”), and that would as such 
result in a harmonious free play of the viewer’s faculties of imagination 
and understanding (BA 28-30). For Kant as for Hutcheson, then, such 
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judgments concerned a pleasure taken in the immediate appearance 
or configuration of the object, to the real existence of which the viewer 
would be indifferent. When this kind of theory of beauty is taken as a 
model for defining art and what is expected from it, every consideration 
beyond the most restricted kind of immediate perception will inevitably 
fall by the wayside.
Crucially, while Bell, Greenberg, Monroe Beardsley, and others may 
have made this move, earlier aesthetic theorists like Hutcheson and 
Kant never did. Especially telling in this regard is that when, in 1999, 
the then-editor of the British Journal of Aesthetics attempted to “bolster 
the credibility of philosophical aesthetics at the end of the twentieth 
century,” he found it necessary to begin with an attack on the historical 
misrepresentations that have come to afflict the Kantian grounds of aes-
thetics.17 For Peter Lamarque, “Kant’s position has become inextricably, 
though unfairly, bound up with extreme forms of aestheticism in art 
criticism that are often used to discredit it” (AU 7). Such “aestheticism” 
is “exemplified by the fin-de-siècle ‘art for art’s sake’ movement and the 
writings of Oscar Wilde, James Whistler, George Moore, Clive Bell, and 
others” (AU 4). As inclusion of the last name on this list suggests, “the 
extreme aestheticist conception, which cuts art off from all social, moral, 
or intellectual concerns,” is that which assumes the “inextricability of 
the aesthetic attitude and artistic formalism.” This tradition appears to 
have misappropriated “the Kantian aesthetic judgment” as sufficient for 
all objects in the world, including works of art, and on this basis con-
cluded that (in Bell’s famous words) “in order to appreciate a work of 
art we need bring with us nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas 
or affairs, no familiarity with its emotions . . . nothing but a sense of 
form and colour and a knowledge of three-dimensional space” (AU 7).
Giving a qualified defense of the account given by Kant of the disin-
terested pleasure taken in pure judgements of taste, Lamarque usefully 
points to exactly how it is that the “position is so often distorted and 
misappropriated.” “Disinterested pleasure,” on the basis of which we 
judge a thing beautiful and claim universal assent in so doing, derives 
from “contemplation of an object as it immediately appears to us, 
without regard to what kind of object it is or any desire on our part to 
make practical use of it.” This is a judgment that requires no thought 
of the “concept of the object” or its “real existence”; it can be made 
“without knowing anything about it or what kind of thing it is—its nature 
might be a complete mystery yet still be pleasing” (AU 6). As Lamarque 
stresses, however, this account captures only “the logic of one kind of 
judgment, that such-and-such is beautiful.” When speaking of works of 
art, Kant denies that such a “pure aesthetic judgment” is “appropriate or 
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even possible”: judgment of a work involves knowledge of “what kind of 
object we are looking at,” including the concept the object falls under, 
and a conception of its “purpose” and “perfection.” Kant’s discussion of 
fine art, according to Lamarque, “implies the need for ‘reflective,’ even 
cognitive, judgment well removed from judgments of beauty alone” (AU 
7). A properly Kantian account of fine art, then, is far more nuanced 
and interesting than attacks on Greenberg and other twentieth-century 
writers have allowed.
Though a relatively familiar point in aesthetics, this same argument 
has since been taken up outside of the discipline within theories of art 
more generally. Diarmuid Costello, for example, has recently made an 
attempt to recover the broadened Kantian account of fine art from its 
neglect at the hands of twentieth-century art theorists.18 Mindful of the 
critical reactions to Greenberg amidst the post-1960s waning of formalist 
modernism and the rise of conceptual art, Costello sees the rejection of 
“Greenberg” to have mistakenly resulted in a wholesale rejection of both 
“Kant” and “aesthetics” in contemporary art theory.19 (The reduction of 
Kant’s theory of fine art to his theory of taste and aesthetic judgement 
is, Costello points out, something that has even influenced aestheticians 
as sophisticated as Arthur Danto.20) Costello instead highlights the 
stress placed by Kant on “aesthetic ideas.” Artworks “present concepts 
that may be encountered in experience, but with a completeness that 
experience never affords,” or they “communicate ideas that cannot—in 
principle—be exhibited in experience.” And they do so in such a way 
“that they imaginatively ‘expand’ the ideas presented in virtue of the 
indirect means through which they are obliged to embody them in 
sensible form” (GK 224).
Rather than engaging in the impossible task of a direct presentation 
of rational ideas in sensuous form, works of art thus present “aesthetic 
attributes” of such ideas “in ways that provoke ‘more thought’ than a 
direct conceptual elaboration of the idea itself could facilitate” (GK 225). 
This “sensible, though necessarily indirect, embodiment of ideas” gener-
ates in the viewer “a kind of free-wheeling, associative play in which the 
imagination moves freely and swiftly from one partial presentation of a 
concept to another.” The value of the work of art is thus not bound up 
with the contemplation of form, nor with straightforward representa-
tion, but in “imaginative engagement” with (indirectly and sensuously 
embodied) ideas (GK 225). Kant’s aesthetics are now revealed as perfectly 
suited to deal with the expanded field of contemporary art, for on this 
reading “many, if not most, works of art typically viewed as anti-aesthetic 
on the formalist conception of aesthetics that the artworld inherits from 
Greenberg nonetheless engage the mind in ways that may be called 
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aesthetic in Kant’s sense” (GK 226).21 This rejection of the formal in 
favor of “aesthetic ideas” shows how easily the narrow version of the 
Kantian account can be turned on its head. “Aesthetics” emerges not as 
a problem for, but as the necessary ground for, a coming to terms with 
conceptual or supposedly “anti-aesthetic” art.
The Narrowness of the Aesthetic: An External Response
The internal response rests on what is still a contested reading or set 
of readings of Kant. The external response is even simpler, and should 
satisfy even those who reject the uncoupling of “Kant” from the old idea 
of “the aesthetic” as a unique and singular form of experience. In short, 
the link between present-day aesthetics and the Kantian tradition that 
supposedly gave birth to it is partial at best. 
Revisionist examination of the style and concerns of those eighteenth-
century English and German thinkers dealing with art and beauty has 
shown again and again how their key notions such as the “aesthetic,” 
“disinterest,” “art,” and the like were often very distant from, and in 
conflict with, present day concerns.22 Thus aesthetics as actually practiced 
today—for the sake of clarity I focus in this section on the analytic tradi-
tion—has had a series of fairly clear ruptures with the eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century traditions of all kinds. As Rancière’s comment on the 
challenge to aesthetics from the “supercilious champion of Anglo-Saxon 
analytic philosophy” suggests, it was clear as early as Alfred Jules Ayer’s 
sweeping critiques of aesthetics in his 1936 Language, Truth, and Logic 
that analytic philosophy would force aesthetics to fight for its survival.23 
Rather than sounding the death knell of aesthetics, however, the rise of 
analytic philosophy meant that the twentieth-century rise (or rebirth) of 
aesthetics in the UK and the US was far more diffuse and harder to pin 
down than it might have been otherwise.24 While such famous names of 
the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century as Bernard Bosanquet 
and Samuel Alexander had by mid-century faded into relative obscu-
rity, many more seemingly “traditional” writers like Benedetto Croce, 
George Santayana, John Dewey, R. G. Collingwood, and even Herbert 
Read maintained their popularity, and were either directly published or 
regularly discussed in the pages of the journal of the American Society 
of Aesthetics, formed in 1939, and of the journal of the British Society 
of Aesthetics, from 1960.
Meanwhile, the response from analytic philosophy was less one of 
abandoning aesthetics as a practice than of trying to set it right. In 
1951 John Passmore’s famous attack on the “dreariness” of traditional 
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aesthetics picked up the tone set by Ayer in 1936: if aesthetics was to 
have any future at all, it would need to abandon the tendency toward 
woolly generalizations about “art” as a whole that led to “dreary and 
pretentious nonsense.”25 In the same decade, William Elton’s Aesthetics 
and Language (1954) marked “the first systematic and self-conscious ef-
fort to bring linguistic methods of analysis to bear on aesthetics,” and 
now-classic papers of the decade by writers such as Morris Weitz (“The 
Role of Theory in Aesthetics” [1956]) and Frank Sibley (“Aesthetic Con-
cepts” [1959]) showed the promise of this new direction.26 The idea of 
some unifying notion of “the aesthetic” attacked by Connor had (as he 
notes) been dismissed in 1956 by Weitz and branded “the first mistake” 
of traditional aesthetics by William Kennick in 1958, while Passmore had 
already in 1951 suggested the same solution of abandoning analysis of 
“art” as a whole in favor of a focus on individual practices.27
By the 1960s Danto and George Dickie were offering definitions of 
art that were in a sense “anti-aesthetic”—as well as directly attacking 
the very concept of “aesthetic experience”—and that focused not on 
inherent aesthetic qualities but on associated art theory (Danto) or “the 
artworld” (Dickie) as the basis of artistic identification.28 The year 1981 
saw a landmark of sorts with the publication of Danto’s Transfiguration 
of the Commonplace, often said to have definitively steered the analytic 
philosophy of art away from the formalism, solipsism, aesthetic-cognitive 
binarism, and narrow readings of Kant that continued to plague it.29 
And by 1989 it seemed to writers like Nelson Goodman and Catherine 
Elgin that the necessary “reconception of the subject, resources, and 
objectives of aesthetics . . . is what analytic philosophy provides.”30 (As a 
demonstrable sign of the openness of analytic aesthetics at this point, it 
is worth noting that the Analytic Aesthetics collection containing Goodman 
and Elgin’s essay included not just the literary critics Charles Altieri and 
Christopher Norris, but also Pierre Bourdieu on “The Historical Genesis 
of a Pure Aesthetic.”) Aesthetics revived via analytic philosophy would 
no longer “overlook the interpenetration of cognitive and aesthetic 
concerns”; it would reject the “attempt to police shifting and inconse-
quential boundaries,” and it would also dispense with the “dichotomies 
of subject and object, emotion and cognition, essence and accident” 
that were previously “imposed a priori rather than derived from our 
encounters with art.”31
In the field of analytic aesthetics at present, where general or universal 
ideas of the aesthetic are not dismissed entirely, their use is often taken to 
preclude any reflexive tie to art or to grand powers claimed on its behalf. 
Such discussions either emphasize how extremely partial the concepts 
are to the analysis of art, or they defend aesthetic experience as broad 
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enough to include cognitive, moral, and other such properties.32 The 
“aesthetics” of the everyday and of nature are fiercely debated without 
the implication that analysis under this heading could ever reduce to a 
narrow kind of beauty or aesthetic experience.33 Investigation can even 
extend to “nonperceptual” artworks that are said to possess no percep-
tible properties relevant to their appreciation as art.34 Many would now 
agree with the suggestion that “philosophy of art” and “aesthetics” should 
be understood as distinct areas of inquiry, designating respectively the 
philosophical investigation of art and of our sensory being in the world 
(BA 1, 20-22). But what this misses is the stress aesthetics places on ways 
that, beyond narrow “aesthetic experience,” the broader investigation 
of perception and experience is often crucial to the study of art or cul-
ture. What passes under the banner of “aesthetics” in Britain and the 
US at present thus includes an expanded study of the philosophy of 
art that, in its abandonment of the unquestioned tie between art and 
the aesthetic, allows for the possibility that narrowly Kantian accounts 
of beauty and aesthetic experience are as “orthogonal” or even irrel-
evant to such interests as one likes. This equally opens the way to the 
reintroduction of less limited accounts of perception and experience 
at the heart of such study.
The Disengagement from Politics
The perceived narrowness of the aesthetic underwrites most charges 
that aesthetics is apolitical or politically suspect. This old or narrowly 
“Kantian” view of aesthetics is still held onto by those who see it as involv-
ing a “particular mode of authoritative aesthetic judgement”—a model 
straightforwardly “derived from Kant’s Critique of Judgment”—and so “do 
not believe the aesthetic approach to visual culture, which inevitably 
cleaves to the connoisseurial tradition and perpetuates its authoritarian 
effects, to be a productive one at this moment in our cultural history.”35 
The responses given above to the narrowness of the aesthetic suggest 
that this is now an anachronistic way to see things. But what more sub-
stantive consequences does the broadening of aesthetics have for its 
potential politics? 
There is now a standard narrative of the newfound political potential 
of aesthetics, moving from a politically motivated critique in the 1970s to 
the beauty-based recovery of the 1990s and to the ethical and political 
turns of the 2000s.36 (Foster’s reflective words on the 1983 Anti-Aesthetic 
seem relevant here: “I also have to admit that we totalized the aesthetic 
and reified it as a bad object for our own purposes. Mea culpa! But we 
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were critics, not philosophers, in a very contested field of discourse and 
politics.”37) The Encyclopedia of Aesthetics now features not just a num-
ber of essays on politics and aesthetics, but also a set of contributions 
highlighted by Kelly as a sign of aesthetics being a “discursive ally” to 
politicized activity, wherein “male-gendered and white-racialized aesthetic 
concepts (for example, beauty and the sublime), once deconstructed, 
can be embraced as forms of subaltern self-empowerment”: “Decoloniz-
ing Aesthetics,” “Disability Aesthetics,” “Disinterestedness,” “Feminism,” 
“Migratory Aesthetics,” “Negritude,” “Trauma,” and “Visual Culture.”38 
(To which could be added the essays on a number of traditions outside 
of the West, on thinkers from Marx to Hélène Cixous, and on subjects 
from the “Canon” and “Sociology of the Artist” to “Race” and “Sexuality.”)
The rise of the political turn in aesthetics has been linked to a wide-
spread movement, especially in the realm of art and literary “theory” 
practiced in departments of English and art history, toward post-Sartrean 
French thought in dialogue with the German aesthetic tradition.39 Ac-
cording to the narrative given by Peter de Bolla and Stefan Uhlig, this 
rethinking of aesthetics shifted attention from the old questions about 
the status of art objects and their place in an artworld to “speculative 
traditions of epistemology, politics, and ethics.”40 Here, above all, it is 
the third Critique—“the Kantian übertext”—that, transformed by a wide 
range of often competing accounts, has seemed to guide the way: “The 
‘aesthetic’ is no longer primarily an area of inquiry for artists, practitio-
ners or even philosophers of art: it has become a bridgehead in our most 
recent attempts to reconceptualise—or perhaps re-colonize—politics, 
society, or the subject. Most especially, it is seen as providing or enabling 
the conceptualization of a counter to what is often viewed as the straight-
jacket of standard epistemology in which the rational enlightenment 
tradition has long been mired.”41 Those involved with this political or 
ethical turn in aesthetics are less likely to dwell on Kant’s accounts of 
beauty or art per se than on the ability of imagination and understand-
ing to explore the richness of particulars without the need to subsume 
them under concepts. Aesthetics, including its acknowledgement of 
the singularity of the artistic or literary work, becomes the source of an 
alternative kind of reason and a form of resistance to “the determinate 
categories of instrumental rationality.”42 This form of strategy embraces 
the universalizing consequences of the unity of aesthetics and artistic 
practices across the board—including the “communities of sense” formed 
via the subjective universality of aesthetic judgement—for their funda-
mentally left-wing, emancipatory possibilities.43 (Even as critical a study 
as Terry Eagleton’s The Ideology of the Aesthetic ends with an appeal to 
what is shared in “human nature” or “species being” in order to ground 
233the fear of aesthetics in art and literary theory
a “materialist ethics” that would also be “aesthetic.”44) This tendency 
ranges across philosophical aesthetics, across broader forms of cultural 
and communication studies, and across contemporary art world practices: 
from Badiou’s Handbook of Inaesthetics and Rancière’s series of works on 
the politics of aesthetics (most recently Aisthesis: Scenes from the Aesthetic 
Regime of Art), to Jill Bennett’s Practical Aesthetics: Events, Affects and Art 
after 9/11, to the debates in the wake of Nicholas Bourriaud’s Relational 
Aesthetics.45 It is in large part due to this line of thought that it now seems 
natural to countenance arguments not just for an art-based “politics” 
of aesthetics, but also for the “new” aesthetics’ intertwinement with the 
ethical, or for an “aesthetic” turn in political thought of various kinds.46
Much of this writing is nonetheless subject to Connor’s critiques of 
the “numinous authority” and implausible “political promise” associ-
ated with a particular politics that attaches to “the aesthetic” and to the 
special idea of “art” that goes with it.47 Given the internal and external 
replies to the narrowness of the aesthetic offered above, however, it 
would be wrong to take this form of the politics-aesthetics connection 
as inevitable. If, after all, aesthetics can deal with the cognitive and can 
be pluralistic, then there is as little need for a quasi-Kantian recovery of 
“the aesthetic” as a way toward the political as there was for the earlier 
“anti-aesthetic” stance of the 1980s. Figures such as W. J. T. Mitchell 
and Rita Felski have made clear that politically motivated practices of 
“visual culture” and “cultural studies” can engage with aesthetics with-
out endorsing narrow conceptualizations of art, beauty, and aesthetic 
experience.48 And even within the disciplinary boundaries of philosophy, 
aesthetics is no longer necessarily seen as either Kantian or universalist. 
Many scholars have long made the case for pluralism, constructivism, and 
even out-and-out relativism about interpretation.49 The feminist critique 
of universalist assumptions about taste and judgement, for example, is 
now a widely acknowledged part of the standard story of the develop-
ment of aesthetics (being within rather than against aesthetics as it now 
exists as a practice).50 This antifoundationalist and anti-Kantian stance 
has been directly explored by at least one of the major figures in the 
“return to beauty,” Alexander Nehamas: in his work, both aspects are 
brought together in a quasi-pragmatist account of beauty and interpreta-
tion that rejects Kant and numinous ideas of the aesthetic for Nietzsche 
and a philosophy of beauty anchored in desire and the practice of lived 
human life.51 All of these responses suggest that the problem does not 
reside in aesthetics per se, but in the error made by any “aesthetics” that 
automatically assumes a politics tied to rereadings of the third Critique. 
Within the broadened conception of aesthetics, the rejection of an in-
herent politics of “the aesthetic” can just as easily be made from within 
aesthetics as from a position against it.
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The Neglect of Art
The failure of aesthetics to actually engage with the objects of art and 
literature is an especially awkward charge to answer properly, given that 
it may be constitutive of its difference from other disciplines. According 
to Elkins, for example, the clash between general truth and historical 
particularity is often thought to define aesthetics in opposition to art 
history: “The argument concerns the nature of what is taken to be either 
irreducibly visual or ungeneralizably singular about artworks. Art history 
would then be the discipline that clings to either or both possibilities, and 
aesthetics the discipline that abstracts or otherwise generalizes them.”52 
Since these words were written in the mid-1990s, however, aestheticians 
have spent an increasing amount of time talking about artworks, often in 
highly sophisticated, historically informed ways. This is especially true of 
analytic aesthetics where the standard “quasi-scientific dialectical method 
of hypothesis/counter-example/modification” in many (though not all) 
cases necessitates the introduction of large numbers of artworks as ex-
amples.53 The more direct focus on the individual case is also commonly 
seen. The journals of the British and American Societies of Aesthetics 
occasionally feature articles on artists or artworks that wouldn’t appear 
out of place in Art Journal or Artforum, while recent books like Aesthetics 
and the Work of Art or Introducing Philosophy of Art: In Eight Case Studies 
are a straightforward reflection of the trend toward grounding abstract 
theorizing in concrete examples.54
But this response is probably too easy. It might be more interesting 
to face head on the proposition that aesthetics by definition isn’t about 
actual artworks—that once the balance of analysis shifts from a general 
theme or concept to the specifics of an artwork, then what is being 
carried out is something more like art history or art criticism. Support 
for this idea can be drawn from the fact that art history and literary 
studies as professional activities are alike in largely being “case”-based, 
with the standard form of an article being the focus on a single theme, 
period, author, or work of art or literature. An expansion from the single 
work to general rumination would then be a move from art history or 
literary study to art or literary “theory”—or aesthetics. On this basis it is 
unsurprising that, far from marooned on a separate island and barely 
able to understand those in aesthetics, as Elkins claimed, art historians 
(including Elkins himself), when in a more generalizing mode, can 
publish in the journals of the British and American Societies of Aesthet-
ics, give keynotes at their conferences, and even win their prizes.55 This 
implies that practice and theory are two sides of the same coin, with 
aesthetics simply being what art or literary historians are doing when 
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the balance of their writing tips from the particular, or case-based, into a 
more generalizing or “theoretical” mode. Aesthetics is just the name for 
the “theory” or “philosophy” part of what art and literary historians do.
One would thus expect a deep dependence on aesthetics in art his-
tory, and this is precisely the case, as long as aesthetics is defined broadly 
and art history is not being written in an entirely positivist mode. When 
books like J. M. Bernstein’s Against Voluptuous Bodies: Late Modernism 
and the Meaning of Painting and Richard Wollheim’s Painting as an Art 
are placed on philosophy shelves and taught in philosophy or theory 
courses, while Rosalind E. Krauss’s The Optical Unconscious and Charles 
Harrison’s Painting the Difference: Sex and Spectator in Modern Art are cat-
egorized as art history, the idea is that the primary goal of the former 
is something like a general account of “the conversion of the materials 
of painting into a medium, and the way in which this medium could 
be so manipulated as to give rise to meaning,” while the latter authors 
care most of all about the accounts of the particular artists and period 
offered.56 At the same time, books in the art history category are still 
likely to be dependent on theory, which they aim to refine in turn. In 
the case of Krauss, this means her own take on the Greenberg-Kant 
tradition via Lyotard, Benjamin, and others, while in Harrison’s work 
a modified version of Wollheim’s philosophy of painting forms the 
underlying premise of the entire book. If our whole understanding of 
an art historical period can rest on a particular reading of the conse-
quences of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology for the experience 
of sculpture, or on the ontology of art revealed by Marcel Duchamp’s 
readymades, then aesthetics is clearly not only the abstracting moment 
of art historical writing, but also its internal motor.57
The “internal motor” aspect here introduces one final problematic, 
suggested by the very name “aesthetics,” as distinct from “the philosophy 
of art.” In its original incarnation, we might remember, aesthetics was 
supposed to stand for the systematic investigation of sensory knowledge. 
This link with the sensory or perceptual suggests a rather different sig-
nificance, as indicated by references to the “aesthetics of x,” where “x” 
might be anything from “the everyday” to “exile” to the individual artis-
tic or literary work. Aesthetics here does not mean “involving aesthetic 
experience” so much as “concerning sensory or perceptual experience.” 
(A point reinforced by the now widespread use of “affect,” stripped of its 
more technical origins, to serve as a less tainted stand-in for the sensory 
or perceptual moment of experience that “the aesthetic” would elsewhere 
serve to designate.58) As such, aesthetics refers less to generalizing about 
the nature of art or literature than to a discourse about the experiential 
moment in an encounter with a work.
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It is to such a conclusion that sympathetic writers on aesthetics since 
the 1980s have pointed, with calls for a reorientation via “a more seri-
ous engagement with the historical specifics of art,” or for an aesthetics 
“compelled to descend to [the level of individual works] to clarify and 
assess the claims about art that they embody. Philosophy and criticism 
become inextricably intertwined, and both become bound to art his-
tory.”59 This conception of aesthetics as a dialectic of theory and critical 
engagement with the individual work has perhaps most openly been 
taken up in de Bolla and Uhlig’s aforementioned volume on Aesthetics 
and the Work of Art, which rejects the process of beginning interpretation 
with a preexisting idea of what art is, and instead aims for an aesthetics 
that emerges in conversation with the work itself. Kelly, also a reviewer, 
sums up the way this process operates in de Bolla’s own writing: 
De Bolla begins with the materiality of the art work (support, size of canvas, 
pigment, etc.) that, when we encounter it, generates an affective experience 
indicating “the presence of an artwork.” He adds that “it is only the work”—not 
aesthetic theory—“that stakes a claim to art”. . . . To summarize, he has an en-
counter with an object and an affective experience, and then he is able to make 
sense of his experience by grasping the aesthetic grammar of this artwork, that 
is, a grammar unique to this work. From which de Bolla concludes: “Herein lies 
the common territory between aesthetics and the work of art: without the work 
this aesthetics would not be visible, still less required, and without aesthetics 
this work would be indiscernible, even unintelligible”. . . . De Bolla insists that 
he can avoid the haunting circularity between aesthetics and the work of art 
because the conceptual grammar of a work of art can be articulated without 
any prior appeal to a general theory of art: “the claim that this object makes to 
artness is sui generis.”60
Aesthetics now fully emerges not just as concerned with the general, 
but also as necessarily engaged with the radically particular. It is not just 
the moment beyond art and literary history, but is also present at the all-
important moment within them: the point when their objects are directly 
encountered and taken in. A truly “anaesthetic” art or literary study 
would not only be one that eschewed aesthetic theorizing, but one that 
refused to countenance the relevance of the thoughts and feelings that 
the work gave rise to in the maker, viewer, or reader. For if aesthetics 
is broadened into “experience” of a more generalized, at least partially 
cognitive sense, the analysis of the moment of experiential encounter with the 
work is simply the same thing as a concern with its aesthetics.
This insight has the interesting consequence that the most historically 
minded, and the most “literary,” of writers can also be those who have 
the deepest engagements with the aesthetics of works of art. Imagina-
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tive, quasipoetic, art historical reflection like that of Michael Ann Holly, 
or art historical discussion deeply sensitive to the experiences that the 
works give rise to like that of Richard Shiff, now explicitly emerges as art 
history inflected by, or in dialogue with, aesthetics.61 Looking backward, 
one could recuperate a great many art historians to this aim. Amongst 
canonical figures a straightforward case would be Michael Baxandall, 
whose careful concern with historical reconstruction was said to be justi-
fied only insofar as it would “prompt other people to a sharper sense of 
the pictorial cogency” of the work in question; “au fond” the art historian 
was just that person found in every group of travelers or tourists “who 
insists on pointing out to the others the beauty or interest of the things 
they encounter.”62 It would now make equal sense to recoup Edward 
Snow, a writer on art whose work has a strong feel of “practical criti-
cism” to it, and who is probably more often read in literature than in 
art history departments. In the opening pages of his book on Johannes 
Vermeer, Snow equates “aesthetic appreciation” with “beauty,” and thus 
sees the former as an “instinctive step backwards” that cannot but help 
retreat from the full range of intensities that a richer relationship with 
the work might involve.63 But though Snow does not acknowledge it, a 
broadened conception of aesthetics avoids this problem, just as it obvi-
ates Connor’s fear of “suspending one’s responses, or cautiously putting 
them in brackets,” in the encounter with art. Snow’s writing itself is the 
ultimate example of how redundant such simplifications are (Fig. 1):
[The pearl’s] tear-likeness betrays, in the very place of art’s triumph, a reluctance 
and a powerlessness at the heart of art’s transformative urges. It condenses, 
renews, and gives visible form to the grief transcended in it. In this it is like 
Head of a Young Girl itself, where the author’s parental care for his creation, 
already overdetermined by the erotics of image-making, becomes implicated 
in an unwillingness to let go, to deliver over into iconicity and otherness. It is 
as if there can still be felt within the finished painting a conflict between the 
slow, loving, self-forgetful time of bringing it into being and the spectatorial 
instant of confronting it as an accomplished work of art, immaculate, closed, 
apart, abandoned at the threshold of life. A desire to remain lost in an open, 
endlessly prolonged act of creation fuses with the knowledge that painting is 
from the first an act of parting, and that those who make art are destined to 
confront not just love and new life but death, loss, and subjective isolation . . 
. In front of perhaps no other painting is there such a feeling that what one 
desires has been found. We lack only the means to reach.64
The concern of this writing is to describe the experience offered by 
the work of art—setting down words on the interplay between “what is 
visible on the canvas” and “what happens inside us as we look at it.”65 
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And finding this kind of vocabulary for affect—as de Bolla would have 
it—is as exemplary of a work-centred aesthetics as it is of an aesthetics-
sensitive art history.66 (For all its apparent absorption in the immediacy 
of the work, there is still an overriding theoretical supposition about 
art developed in Snow’s writing, to do with the notion that “something 
stays this way we cannot have, / Comes alive because we cannot have 
it.”67) Avowedly resistant to beauty and aesthetic appreciation as it may 
be, his whole project might be summed up with the same words that 
have recently been used to give the goal of a rejuvenated aesthetics: 
Figure 1. Johannes Vermeer, Girl with a Pearl Earring, c. 1665, oil on canvas, 44.5 x 39 cm, 
The Hague: Mauritshuis (Photo: Wikipedia Commons).
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“the analysis of experiential or perceptual qualities of historically re-
constituted artworks.”68
Nothing to be Afraid Of
At this point it looks like Kelly’s optimism may have been justified. 
Aesthetics does not reduce to simplistic questions of beauty, does not 
reduce “the arts” to singular kinds of experience and judgement, and 
is a broad enough term to reject any strict binary that would rule the 
cognitive out of bounds, including socially and historically inflected 
forms of experience. Aesthetics also (even within the analytic tradition 
alone) deals with a great many issues into which “the aesthetic” enters 
only partially, if at all. One can be cautious about “the aesthetic” or 
even reject it entirely, while still happily continuing to benefit from an 
interest in aesthetics. On these bases, there is plenty of room for eth-
ics and politics, whether in relation to art itself or to the new political 
possibilities that thinking with the aesthetic opens up. It may even be 
the case that anti- or dubiously political stances on beauty and the like 
can only be properly countered from within the arguments of aesthet-
ics. Finally, aesthetics as now practiced includes sensitive discussion of 
artistic practices of various kinds without the need to homogenize the 
arts, or even to abstract beyond the encounter with the individual work. 
I want, nonetheless, to suggest in closing that this victory may come 
at a price, albeit one that happy pluralists can take to be positive and 
necessary. At one point in “Doing Without Art,” Connor recoils at the 
suggestion that his adumbration of a philosophy of fidgeting might be a 
step toward “an aesthetics of everyday life,” along with “the principles of 
emancipation, transfiguration, or resistance that such an aesthetic would 
underwrite.”69 But on the terms of a rejuvenated aesthetics, the error of 
this suggestion lies not in its appeal to “aesthetics” as such, but rather in 
the subsequent assumption that this would involve particular theorists 
that would lead the project in a particular direction. What justification 
could there possibly now be, aside from laziness or habit, to appeal to 
Kant and reworkings of the third Critique, rather than to Michel Serres 
or another of Connor’s preferred thinkers?70
In short, inasmuch as it deals with art and culture, the “new” aesthet-
ics buys its freedom from past caricatures or overly narrow concepts of 
the subject at the expense of anything that might differentiate it from 
cultural theory generally. Gone are all first principles and assumptions, 
above all the safety of the Kantian foundations, and the stable working 
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definition of (or even belief in) entities like art and aesthetic experience. 
Rote appeals to the special powers of the aesthetic or art emerge now 
not as being bolstered by the practice of aesthetics, but as having got 
aesthetics wrong—as having mistaken an invitation to thought for a safe 
route along which that thought can proceed. Even attempts to distinguish 
“philosophy of art” from aesthetics break down. Aesthetics appears to 
have an intertwining macro- and microfunction, standing not just for 
an abstracting tendency toward theoretical discussion but also for the 
kind of analysis that deals with the specificity of the perceptual or expe-
riential encounter. Aesthetics is now “critical reflection on art, culture, 
and nature,” at the same time that it is “the analysis of experiential or 
perceptual qualities of historically reconstituted artworks.” These two 
aspects revolve around and feed into each other, necessarily constituting 
the practice of aesthetics as it has been outlined here.
On the logic of this recovery of aesthetics, wherever critical thinking 
about art and culture takes place, there may be no principled way left 
to differentiate between “theory” as such and the form of aesthetics that 
has made the moves necessary to escape its various critics. Some will feel 
this dissolves the fear of aesthetics, leaving behind the stifling nature 
of the subject when narrowly conceived. For others this shift, more 
worryingly, may signal a dissolution or even deletion of the subject as a 
whole. Much now depends on the extent to which aesthetics can avoid 
the turn back to narrow Kantian roots or reductive notions of “art” or 
“the aesthetic,” while at the same time leading to productive research 
that actively exploits its potential breadth and freedom. One strong pos-
sibility is that traditional “microfunction” concerns with perception and 
experience, bypassing the reductivist blind alleys, will give exactly this 
kind of impetus to distinctive and innovatory work on art and culture. 
Another is that “aesthetics” will end up as no more than a catch-all term 
for thinking about art, culture, and nature, and it will have escaped its 
critics and rendered itself largely empty at the same time.
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